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Shareholder primacy has long dominated American legal thought and politics 
across the ideological spectrum. Over the past several years, however, U.S. 
political progressives have begun to criticize shareholder primacy, arguing 
that corporations should also serve other stakeholders. This Note conducts the 
first academic analysis of this emerging movement’s executive compensation 
policy proposals. This Note finds that stakeholder-primacy progressives have 
failed to propose policies that would effectively regulate executive 
compensation. Given the connection between rising executive compensation 
and economic inequality, this finding is surprising and concerning. The final 
Part develops an original executive compensation policy proposal for the 
progressive stakeholder primacy movement. 
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Introduction 
In August 2018, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren announced her 
Accountable Capitalism Act1—a bold new proposal to “restore[] the idea that 
giant American corporations should look out for American interests.”2 The 
Accountable Capitalism Act is an ambitious bill geared toward promoting a 
populist ethos in American corporate law: as Senator Warren wrote in the Wall 
Street Journal, “[c]orporate profits are booming, but average wages haven’t 
budged over the past year. The U.S. economy has run this way for decades. . . . 
I’m introducing legislation to fix it.”3 
Given the prominence of populism in American politics since the 2016 
presidential election cycle, the bill’s loudly populist bent was unsurprising. 
What was remarkable, however, was the legislation’s chief philosophical 
target: shareholder primacy—the corporate-governance theory that boards of 
directors should primarily serve shareholders, rather than customers, workers, 
and other stakeholders, in making important corporate policy decisions. “What 
are the obligations of corporate citizenship in the U.S.?” asked Senator Warren 
in her op-ed. “For much of U.S. history, the answers were clear. Corporations 
sought to succeed in the marketplace, but they also recognized their obligations 
to employees, customers and the community. . . . This approach worked. 
American companies and workers thrived.”4 During the 1980s, however, 
according to Warren, “[t]he dynamic changed . . . . a new theory emerged that 
corporate directors had only one obligation: to maximize shareholder returns.”5 
This shareholder-centered theory of the firm was first introduced in the 
United States by law professor Adolf Berle in 1931.6 Professor Berle asserted 
that the powers of corporate managers may be exercised only for the benefit of 
shareholders.7 E. Merrick Dodd, one of Berle’s contemporaries, sharply 
disagreed, responding that corporations have “a social service as well as a 
profit-making function” and igniting the famed Berle-Dodd debate of 
stakeholder versus shareholder primacy.8 Berle’s shareholder-primacy theory 
 
1. The Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018). 
2. Elizabeth Warren, Opinion, Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders, 





6. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931). 
7. Id. at 1049. 
8. E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 
1367 (1932); see A.A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate 
Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33 (1991). There is a related, longstanding corporate law 
debate in the United States and abroad between “contractarians” and “communitarians,” or 
“institutionalists.” See, e.g., David K. Millon, New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, 




did not take hold as the dominant theory of corporate governance in the United 
States until the 1970s and early 1980s, when the theory was popularized by 
conservative economist Milton Friedman. Friedman claimed that the “primary 
responsibility” of corporate executives is to the firm’s shareholders, who “own” 
the corporation.9 In Friedman’s view, corporate managers must not engage with 
“social responsibility” unless doing so would maximize returns to shareholders. 
“There is one and only one social responsibility of business,” argued Friedman, 
“—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its 
profits.”10 
Despite shareholder primacy’s conservative nascence, by the late 2000s 
U.S. political progressives had adopted the theory as a mechanism to rein in 
misbehaving corporations. According to this new Democrat rationale, not only 
should the corporation primarily serve shareholders, but it should also be 
governed by them, with shareholders retaining influence over key managerial 
decisions. During the late 2000s, Democrats championed several shareholder 
power-enhancing policies in Congress.11 In 2009, Senator Charles Schumer (D-
NY) introduced the Shareholder Bill of Rights Act.12 Cosponsored by Senator 
Maria Cantwell (D-WA), the bill’s primary aim was to “provide shareholders 
with enhanced authority” over the nomination, election, and compensation of 
corporate executives and directors.13 Senator Schumer, in unveiling the Act, 
argued that “shareholders had too little say” over corporate-governance matters 
during the Great Recession, allowing executives to take on excessive risk and 
earn “too much in salary.”14 Among the bill’s stated findings was the assertion 
 
9. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. 1 (Sept. 13, 1970), http://umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4EN-
LXGV]. Shareholder primacy was further discussed and popularized by other prominent economists and 
legal scholars. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (introducing the related, 
highly influential theory of “agency costs”). For some of Daniel Fischel’s seminal work drawing on 
Jensen and Meckling’s theories, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); and Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for 
Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1978). 
10. Friedman, supra note 9, at 6. 
11. See, e.g., Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009) (sponsored 
by Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY), requiring a shareholder vote on executive compensation, proxy 
statement disclosure of “golden parachute” arrangements, and establishing shareholder-friendly proxy 
access rules); Shareholder Protection Act, H.R. 4790, 111th Cong. (2010) (sponsored by Representative 
Michael Capuano (D-MA), providing for a shareholder vote on corporate political campaign 
expenditures). Notably, after the Great Recession, longtime consumer advocate Ralph Nader also 
jumped on the shareholder rights bandwagon, reasoning that “[o]nce you awaken shareholders . . . more 
civic values will be incorporated into society.” Steven Davidoff Solomon, Nader, an Adversary of 
Capitalism, Now Fights as an Investor, DEALBOOK, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2014), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/14/nader-an-adversary-of-capitalism-now-fights-as-an-investor 
[https://perma.cc/69DF-FAYV]. 
12. S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009). 
13. Id. § 2(3), (4). 
14. Karey Wutkowski, U.S. Sen. Schumer Unveils Shareholder Bill of Rights, REUTERS (May 
19, 2009, 12:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-financial-shareholders-schumer-
idUSTRE54I4PF20090519 [https://perma.cc/S24L-5MHV] (quoting Senator Schumer). 
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that lack of accountability to shareholders—the corporation’s “ultimate 
owners”—had contributed to the economic crisis, resulting in the loss of 
“trillions of dollars in shareholder value.”15 
The Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, sponsored by Representative 
Michael Capuano (D-MA) and cosponsored by forty-nine other House 
Democrats, aimed to mandate a binding shareholder vote on political campaign 
spending by corporations.16 The legislation invoked the central rationale of 
shareholder primacy, finding that “[c]orporations, acting through their boards 
and executives, are obligated to conduct business for the best interests of their 
owners, the shareholders.”17 
Perhaps the most significant of these Democrat-backed policies was “say 
on pay” legislation that would require U.S. public companies to hold a regular 
advisory shareholder vote to approve their executive-compensation policies. 
The Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, an early say-on-pay 
bill, was introduced by Representative Barney Frank (D – MA) and then-
Senator Barack Obama (D – IL) in the spring of 2007.18 Though the Act failed, 
congressional Democrats eventually succeeded in enacting mandatory say-on-
pay legislation for U.S. public companies as part of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.19 Dodd-Frank also included other 
Democrat-supported policies intended to enhance shareholder choice such as 
the pay-ratio disclosure requirement,20 which was later championed by Senator 
Warren herself.21 
Given shareholder primacy’s established Democrat backing, Senator 
Warren’s unabashed rebuff of it may seem striking. But Senator Warren is not 
the only left-leaning American politician who has recently promoted the idea 
that corporations should serve societal interests beyond those of shareholders. 
In the past year, Democrat senators Bernie Sanders,22 Tammy Baldwin,23 Cory 
 
15. S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009). 
16. H.R. 4790, 111th Cong. (2010). 
17. Id. § 2(2). 
18. H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1181, 110th Cong. (2007). These say on pay proposals 
were vigorously opposed by congressional Republicans. See Blog, House Passes Executive 
Compensation Act, SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE NANCY PELOSI (Apr. 20, 2007), 
https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/house-passes-shareholder-vote-on-executive-compensation-act 
[https://perma.cc/6NJM-FQUZ] (describing a Republican motion to recommit the bill, which would “in 
effect kill[] it”). 
19. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (requiring listed public companies to hold periodic say-on-pay 
shareholder votes on the compensation of executive officers). 
20. Id. § 953(b). 
21. Letter from Senator Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senate to Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n (June 2, 2015) https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2015-6-
2_Warren_letter_to_SEC.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2VF-85PY]. 
22. See Stop WALMART (Welfare for Any Large Monopoly Amassing Revenue from 
Taxpayers) Act of 2018, S. 3410, 115th Cong. (2018); Chuck Schumer & Bernie Sanders, Opinion, 






Booker,24 and Chuck Schumer,25 representing multiple factions of the 
contemporary Democratic Party, have all proposed legislation that would 
require corporations to promote nonshareholder interests, such as by adopting 
worker representation on corporate boards and limiting corporate stock 
buybacks.26 Viewed in perspective, Senator Warren and her colleagues are on 
the front line of a new wave of progressive corporate political thought, one that 
some have called “stakeholder primacy.”27 
Central to the progressive stakeholder primacy movement is a concern 
about the United States’s ever-growing income and wealth inequality. 
According to shareholder primacy’s critics, this philosophy has driven a surge 
in economic inequality in recent decades by funneling more and more corporate 
wealth to shareholders, a group that is already disproportionately rich. As 
Senator Warren wrote in the Wall Street Journal, “[b]ecause the wealthiest 
10% of U.S. households own 84% of American-held shares, the obsession with 
maximizing shareholder returns effectively means America’s biggest 
companies have dedicated themselves to making the rich even richer.”28 
The Accountable Capitalism Act is designed, first and foremost, to 
combat this ballooning economic inequality. The bill would require all U.S. 
companies with greater than $1 billion in annual revenue to obtain a federal 
corporate “charter” stating that the corporation “shall have the purpose of 
creating a general public benefit,”29 which is defined as a “material positive 
impact on society.”30 Directors and officers of U.S. corporations covered by the 
Act would commit to balancing “the pecuniary interests of the shareholders . . . 
with the best interests of persons that are materially affected by the 
[corporation’s] conduct,” including employees, customers, the communities in 
which the company’s offices and facilities are located, and “the local and 
global environment.”31 The Act would further require that the corporation’s 
workers elect at least two-fifths of the board of directors.32 Corporations 
seeking to make political campaign contributions would need to obtain 
 
23. See Reward Work Act, S. 2605, 115th Cong. (2018). 
24. See Worker Dividend Act, S. 2505, 115th Cong. (2018). 
25. See Schumer & Sanders, supra note 22. 
26. Eillie Anzilotti, Elizabeth Warren’s Bold New Plan to Give Corporate Wealth Back to 
Workers, FAST CO. (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90223130/how-elizabeth-warrens-
accountable-capitalism-act-works [https://perma.cc/8TRB-U8CZ]. 
27. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance; Stakeholder Primacy; Federal 
Incorporation, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 17, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/17/corporate-governance-stakeholder-primacy-federal-
incorporation [https://perma.cc/8CDU-2N92] (describing the Accountable Capitalism Act as “reject[ing] 
shareholder primacy and embrac[ing] stakeholder governance”). Proponents of stakeholder primacy 
generally include customers, employees, suppliers, and communities in their definition of a stakeholder. 
See infra note 147. 
28. Warren, supra note 2. 
29. S. 3348 §§ 4, 5(b)(2), 115th Cong. (2018). 
30. Id. § 5(a)(1). 
31. Id. § 5(c)(1). 
32. Id. § 6. 
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approval from three-fourths of their shareholders and three-fourths of the 
board.33 Finally, directors and officers receiving equity compensation would be 
prohibited from selling these shares within five years of receipt and within 
three years of a company stock repurchase.34 
For those concerned by economic inequality in America, the bill contains 
commendable policy ideas. But a troubling deficiency remains: the bill lacks a 
robust policy to control the executive compensation distributed by U.S. 
corporations. Certainly, the bill contains provisions that would likely have 
some indirect effect on executive pay, in particular by limiting executives’ 
ability to sell shares received as equity compensation in the short term, placing 
worker-appointees on boards, and giving directors an emphatic duty to consider 
non-shareholder interests. As this Note establishes in Part IV, however, these 
provisions fall short of effectively limiting the amounts of compensation paid 
to U.S. executives. 
Senator Warren is not alone in her failure to promote a strong vision for 
executive-compensation regulation. After engaging in the first academic 
analysis of the progressive stakeholder-primacy movement’s executive-
compensation-policy proposals, this Note finds that none of these proposals 
would effectively regulate executive compensation.35 Given the demonstrated 
link between skyrocketing executive compensation and the rising wealth and 
income inequality in the United States,36 this oversight is both surprising and 
deeply concerning. 
The answer to this political puzzle could lie in the widespread progressive 
support for and presumed success of say on pay. As mentioned above, section 
951 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires U.S. public companies to give shareholders 
the opportunity to cast a nonbinding, advisory vote on executive compensation 
packages at least once every three years.37 At the time of Dodd-Frank’s 
enactment, many progressives cheered the inclusion of the say-on-pay 
provision as a success in the fight against corporate America’s exponential C-
suite pay growth.38 The paucity of stakeholder-oriented CEO pay policy 
proposals would be reasonable if the U.S. say-on-pay law and other 
shareholder-empowering executive compensation laws could be trusted to 
work. Growing evidence, though, suggests they cannot. As I explain in Part II, 
executive-compensation and economic=inequality data show that say on pay 
 
33. Id. § 8. 
34. Id. § 7. 
35. See discussion infra Part IV. 
36. See discussion infra Part I. 
37. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010). 
38. See Andrea Fuller, House Approves Limits on Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/01/business/01pay.html [https://perma.cc/UB7Y-S868] (quoting 
Speaker Pelosi arguing that “[e]mpowering financial regulators to prohibit risky bonus practices by 
financial firms is not only long overdue, but the responsible thing to do for the taxpayers, who have 




has not been successful in slowing the growth of executive compensation and 
economic inequality in the United States. 
Part III argues that the failure of shareholder-focused executive 
compensation laws should come as no surprise. Drawing on several studies 
analyzing shareholder voting behavior and demographics, I argue that U.S. 
dispersed shareholders possess neither the capacity nor the incentives to 
effectively limit executive pay. I conclude that in addition to being an 
ineffective regulator, say-on-pay voting has the potential to worsen economic 
inequality by ratifying high compensation and incentivizing short-termism and 
excessive risk-taking by corporate managers. 
In Part IV, I engage in the first academic analysis of the emerging 
stakeholder-primacy movement’s executive compensation policy proposals. In 
analyzing these policy proposals, I explain why they would fail to place 
effective limits on executive compensation. In Part V, I put forward my own 
stakeholder-oriented executive compensation proposal, one that returns the 
responsibility for controlling executive compensation to corporate directors and 
guides their decision-making by 1) imposing industry-based caps on CEO-
worker pay ratios for large public companies, 2) mandating an advisory worker 
vote on executive compensation, and 3) repealing say on pay. 
The literature on executive compensation is voluminous and dates back to 
some of the oldest debates in corporate law.39 Like so many corporate-
governance topics, the issue of how to regulate executive compensation boils 
down to the two most fundamental questions of corporate law: 1) whose 
interests should the corporation serve?;40 and 2) who should decide?41 As the 
first paper to connect the emerging wave of progressive stakeholder primacy in 
U.S. politics to our nation’s current executive compensation laws, this Note 
contributes to the existing literature by identifying and analyzing the significant 
gap between these two regimes and proposing a novel, progressive way 
forward. 
I. Economic Inequality and Rising Executive Compensation in the United 
States 
In this Part, I address the key policy issue of the progressive stakeholder 
primacy movement—economic inequality in the United States—and show how 
rising executive compensation contributes to economic inequality. In Section 
I.A, I describe the current state of income and wealth inequality in the United 
 
39. See, e.g., Robert B. Mautz & Gerald W. Rock, The Wages of Management, 11 U. FLA. L. 
REV. 474, 474 (1958) (asking, “[w]ho manages this vast concentration of public wealth; how much 
compensation is paid to them; who controls the determination of the amount of compensation; and what 
standards are used to measure the price paid to management?”). 
40. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
41. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is ‘Say on Pay’ Justified?, 32 REG. 42, 46 (2009) 
(“There is no more basic question in corporate governance than ‘Who decides?’ Is a particular decision 
or oversight task to be assigned to the board of directors, management, or shareholders?”). 
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States. In Section I.B, I examine executive compensation at American 
companies. I conclude with the connection between rising executive 
compensation and growing income inequality in Section I.C. 
A. America’s Ever-Growing Economic Inequality 
Since the early 2000s, economists, the media, the public, and politicians 
have become increasingly concerned by America’s widening income and 
wealth gaps. Economists Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel 
Zucman document the meteoric rise in income and wealth inequality in the 
United States from the 1980s through 2015.42 Their findings paint a striking 
economic portrait of the United States, showing that the average pre-tax income 
of the bottom 50% of earners has stagnated since 1980, while the average 
income of the top 1% has more than tripled.43 
According to Piketty and Saez, and supported by the findings of other 
economists,44 the growth in income inequality since 1980 is largely due to the 
skyrocketing incomes of the top 1% of American earners:  
 
[T]he vast majority of the population—from the bottom up to the 87th 
percentile— experienced less growth than the (modest) macro rate of 1.4% a 
year . . . The only group that grew fast is the top 1%, whose average income 
increased 3.3% pre-tax and 3.2% post-tax. . . . The top 1% has pulled apart from 
the rest of the economy—not the top 20%.45  
 
Growth in wealth inequality has been even more concentrated, with the 
majority of gains accruing to the top 0.1% of families (those with greater than 
$20 million in wealth in 2012).46 
Saez provides important insight into how American economic-inequality 
trends compare to those of other countries. Using data from the World Wealth 
and Income Database, Saez shows that the United States, the United Kingdom 
and Canada have all experienced similar patterns of steadily rising income 
inequality since 1980, though the United Kingdom and Canada have seen 
slightly less growth.47 Meanwhile, France, Sweden and Japan had levels of 
income inequality similar to that of the United States before 1970 but have not 
experienced nearly the same increase in income concentration in the decades 
since.48 According to Saez, this finding indicates that the United States’ 
 
42. Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Distributional National Accounts: 
Methods and Estimates for the United States, 133 Q.J. ECON. 553 (2018); Emmanuel Saez, Income and 
Wealth Inequality: Evidence and Policy Implications, 35 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 7 (2017). 
43. Piketty, Saez & Zucman, supra note 42, at 557. 
44. See infra sources cited notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
45. Piketty, Saez & Zucman, supra note 42, at 580. 
46. Saez, supra note 42, at 13. 
47. Id. at 17. 




growing income inequality must be due partially to domestic factors, because 
all six countries have been subject to the same general trends of globalization 
and technological progress.49 
B. American Companies’ Ever-Increasing Executive Compensation 
Just as income inequality has increased steadily since the 1980s, so too 
has the gap between executive compensation and average wages. A series of 
reports by the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) charts the meteoric rise in CEO 
pay and the concurrent stagnation in worker wages since the 1960s.50 
Examining the CEO pay packages and average worker compensation granted 
by the top 350 U.S. firms (ranked by gross sales) since 1965, a 2018 EPI report 
shows that the CEO-worker pay ratio grew from 20-to-1 in 1965, to 58-to-1 in 
1989, to a staggering 311.7-to-1 in 2017.51 From a percentage growth 
perspective, this evolution looks even more devastating: as the EPI reported in 
2012, “From 1978 to 2011, CEO compensation increased more than 725 
percent, a rise substantially greater than stock market growth and the painfully 
slow 5.7 percent growth in worker compensation over the same period.”52 
Between 2016 and 2017 alone, average CEO compensation for the top 350 U.S. 
firms jumped 17.6%, up to $18.9 million.53 Unsurprisingly, the United States 
leads most other countries in its CEO-average worker pay ratio. According to 
Bloomberg, the United States’ 2017 CEO-average worker pay ratio of 264.8 
was nearly double that of Germany (136.1) and more than double those of 
Australia (109.5) and France (69.7). The United States’ nearest pay-ratio peers 
were India (229.1) and the United Kingdom (201).54 
C. Rising Executive Compensation as a Key Driver of Economic Inequality 
The data on economic inequality and executive compensation in the 
United States reveal a strong link between rising executive compensation levels 
and the massive economic inequality growth since the 1980s. Piketty, Saez, and 
Zucman and the EPI studies show that growth in income inequality has been 
 
49. Id. (“[T]his very simple finding is important because it tells you that growing income 
inequality since the 1970s is not just due to globalization or technological progress (e.g., computers) 
because all six countries [studied]…have gone through the same process of technological progress, and 
they are subject to the same forces of globalization, yet the evolution of inequality or income 
concentration varies.”). 
50. Lawrence Mishel & Jessica Schieder, CEO Compensation Surged in 2017, ECON. POL’Y 
INST. (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-compensation-surged-in-2017 
[https://perma.cc/A5G7-ALW8]; Natalie Sabadish & Lawrence Mishel, CEO Pay and the Top 1%: How 
Executive Compensation and Financial-Sector Pay Have Fueled Income Inequality, ECON. POL’Y INST. 
(May 2, 2012), https://www.epi.org/publication/ib331-ceo-pay-top-1-percent [https://perma.cc/NYM3-
ZXW9]. 
51. Mishel & Schieder, supra note 50, at 1, 6. 
52. Sabadish & Mishel, supra note 50 at 2 (emphases added). 
53. Mishel & Schieder, supra note 50, at 1, 6. 
54. See Wei Lu, Bloomberg Global CEO Pay Index, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 28, 2017). 
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primarily caused by growth in the income of the top one percent of American 
earners.55 The 2012 EPI study further establishes that this top-one-percent 
income growth is substantially due to rising executive compensation. 
According to the report, within the top 1% and top 0.1%, the majority of 
income gains accrued to households headed by executives or finance 
professionals.  
 
Executives, and workers in finance, accounted for 58 percent of the expansion of 
income for the top 1 percent and 67 percent of the increase in income for the top 
0.1 percent from 1979 to 2005 . . . Households headed by a non-finance 
executive were associated with 44 percent of the growth of the top 0.1 percent’s 
income share and 36 percent in the growth among the top 1.0 percent.56 
 
Economist Joseph Stiglitz builds on these findings, attributing the growth 
in top incomes over the past three decades to “rent-seeking” by corporate 
executives.57 Stiglitz defines rent-seeking as “getting an income not as a reward 
for creating wealth but by grabbing a larger share of the wealth that would have 
been produced anyway.”58 According to Stiglitz, rent-seekers typically destroy 
rather than create wealth in the process of funneling it away from others.59 
Thus, rather than promoting economic gains for society as a whole, expanding 
executive compensation has merely redistributed economic gains to the very 
top, and has destroyed some economic productivity in the process. 
The established connection between rising executive compensation and 
America’s ever-widening income gap highlights why stakeholder-primacy 
progressivism, due to its fundamental concern with economic inequality, 
should care deeply about constraining executive-compensation growth. 
II. Executive Compensation Laws in the United States: Have They Worked? 
In this Part, I describe and evaluate the United States’s current executive-
compensation legal regime, and explain how these laws have failed to limit 
executive-compensation growth. In Section II.A, I discuss the primary laws 
governing executive compensation in the United States today. I then delve 
more deeply into one of these laws—say on pay—in Section II.B and discuss 
 
55. Piketty, Saez & Zucman, supra note 42, at 580; Saez, supra note 42, at 12-13; Sabadish & 
Mishel, supra note 50, at 1 (“Driving this ever-widening gap is the unequal growth in earnings enjoyed 
by those at the top. The average annual earnings of the top 1 percent of wage earners grew 156 percent 
from 1979 to 2007; for the top 0.1 percent they grew 362 percent….In contrast, earners in the 90th to 
95th percentiles had wage growth of 34 percent, less than a tenth as much as those in the top 0.1 percent 
tier. Workers in the bottom 90 percent had the weakest wage growth, at 17 percent from 1979 to 
2007.”). 
56. Sabadish & Mishel, supra note 50, at 2. 
57. Joseph Stiglitz, Inequality and Economic Growth, 86 POL. Q. 134, 134 (2016). 





its results since its enactment in 2011. I close Part II with a brief note on the 
early results of the CEO-worker pay ratio disclosure rule. 
A. America’s Executive Compensation Laws 
United States law imposes five primary executive-pay-related regulations 
on U.S. public companies: 1) executive and director compensation disclosure 
requirements,60 2) corporate tax deductibility limitations on executive 
compensation over $1 million,61 3) state fiduciary duty laws,62 4) say on pay,63 
and 5) the CEO-median employee pay ratio disclosure requirement.64 In this 
Section, I survey the first three of these laws, none of which impose meaningful 
limitations on executive compensation. I then turn to say on pay and the CEO-
median employee pay ratio disclosure rule in the subsequent sections. 
1. Executive Compensation Disclosure Requirements 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has required public 
companies to disclose their executive and director compensation in some form 
since 1938. In 1992, the SEC amended Item 402 of Regulation S-K (which lists 
information that must be disclosed in issuers’ regular filings and proxy 
statements) to require “tabulated” disclosure of compensation, including a 
formatted summary compensation table that highlights the dollar value of 
director and executive compensation awards.65 In 2006, the SEC further 
amended these requirements to add a narrative “Compensation Discussion and 
Analysis” summary of the “material factors underlying compensation policies 
and decisions,” particularly how the issuers’ executive-compensation policy is 
designed to respond to performance.66 The amendments may have succeeded in 
providing enhanced executive-compensation information to shareholders, 
allowing the market to more accurately price corporate stock by factoring in 
executive-compensation expenditures. However, some think that the 1992 
enhanced-disclosure rule also caused a ratcheting-up effect in executive pay, as 
 
60.  Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 
2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 239, 240, 245, 249, 274). 
61. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2018). 
62. See infra Subsection II.A.3. 
63. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
953(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); S.E.C. Rule 14a-21 (2018). 
64. Regulation S-K, Item 402, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2018); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act § 953(b). 
65. See 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126, Executive Compensation Disclosure, S.E.C. Release No. 33-
6962 (Oct. 16, 1992). 
66. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158, 53,160 
(Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 239, 240, 245, 249, 274). 
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management took note of how much competitors were paying and companies 
tried to outbid each other for top talent.67 
2. Tax Deductibility Limitations 
Another executive compensation policy of the 1990s was Section 162(m) 
of the Internal Revenue Code.68 Concerned with excessive executive pay, 
Congress in 1993 adopted Section 162(m), which limited publicly traded 
corporations’ ability to deduct executive compensation over $1 million. 
However, “[q]ualified performance-based” compensation, defined as 
compensation “payable solely on the account of the attainment of one or more 
performance goals,” was exempted from the deductibility cap.69 In the years 
following its enactment, this exception was much criticized for being a 
significant loophole and promoting high-value equity payouts, contributing to 
ballooning executive pay.70 In response to this widespread criticism, the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 eliminated the performance-based compensation 
exception to 162(m).71 Analysis of company pay practices after the adoption of 
162(m), though, shows that the elimination of the performance-based pay 
exception will likely have little effect on corporate pay packages. According to 
a ProPublica study of compensation at the 40 largest firms in the S&P 500, 
since 1992, the year before 162(m) became effective, executive compensation 
subject to the deductibility cap has risen almost twice as fast as fully deductible 
performance-based pay, far exceeding the $1 million cap.72 This statistic 
indicates that 162(m)’s deductibility cap does not meaningfully constrain 
executive compensation awards, and so it is unlikely that the new 162(m) will 
have a significant effect on executive pay. 
 
67. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL 17 (2009) (“Once salaries became public 
information, the media regularly ran special stories ranking CEOs by pay. Rather than suppressing the 
executive perks, the publicity had CEOs in America comparing their pay with that of everyone else. In 
response, executives’ salaries sky-rocketed.”). 
68. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13211, 107 Stat. 312, 469-71 (1993) (codified at I.R.C. § 162(m) 
(2012)). 
69. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2012). 
70. Senator Warren, among others, criticized the old § 162(m) for this reason. See Max 
Ehrenfreund, Why Elizabeth Warren Thinks Bill Clinton Made CEO Pay Even Worse, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 27, 2015, 8:00 AM EST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/04/27/bill-
clinton-tried-to-limit-ceo-pay-but-elizabeth-warren-thinks-he-made-it-worse [https://perma.cc/U45R-
SZGU]. 
71. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2018); see Jean M. McLoughlin & Ron M. Aizen, IRS Guidance on 
Section 162(m) Tax Reform, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Sept. 26, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/26/irs-guidance-on-section-162m-tax-reform 
[https://perma.cc/9SGD-T6RT]. 






3. State Fiduciary Duty Law 
Engaging in a full discussion of state fiduciary-duty law as it relates to 
executive compensation is beyond the scope of this Note. However, it is worth 
stating that current state fiduciary duty law, most pertinently Delaware law,73 
gives directors significant discretion in setting executive pay packages.74 Under 
Delaware law, executive compensation decisions are primarily constrained by 
the corporate-waste doctrine, under which plaintiffs have the burden to prove 
that the compensation-setting process was “so one sided that no business 
person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has 
received adequate consideration.”75 According to the Delaware Supreme Court, 
“[a] claim of waste will arise only in the rare, ‘unconscionable case where 
directors irrationally squander or give away corporate assets.’”76 In other 
words, plaintiffs must show that the board’s decision cannot be “attributed to 
any rational business purpose.”77 As the bar for holding directors accountable 
for agreeing to excessive-compensation policies is quite high, very few 
executive-compensation shareholder suits prevail under Delaware law.78 Most 
scholars believe that, as a result, Delaware law does not effectively limit 
corporate executive-compensation payouts.79 
B. Say on Pay in the United States: Has it Worked? 
As discussed above, the U.S. say-on-pay provision was enacted as section 
951 of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.80 Section 951, and its implementing rule 
by the SEC,81 require that U.S. public companies give shareholders the 
opportunity to cast an advisory vote on the compensation of the corporation’s 
executives as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K at least once 
every three years.82 Related provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act also require 
 
73. Here, Delaware corporate fiduciary law is the most pertinent state fiduciary-duty law 
because the vast majority of large U.S. public companies are incorporated in Delaware. In 2018, 67.2% 
of Fortune 500 companies were incorporated in Delaware, and 82% of companies undergoin g a U.S.-
based initial public offering chose to incorporate in Delaware. Annual Report Statistics, DEL. DIV. OF 
CORPS. (2018), https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/Annual-Reports/Division-of-Corporations-2018-Annual-
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/G734-QKAR]. 
74. Delaware law, however, does apply the stricter “entire fairness” test to directors’ setting of 
their own compensation in the absence of shareholder ratification. See, e.g., Calma v. Templeton, 114 
A.3d 563 (Del. 2015). 
75. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006) (quoting 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 263 (Del. 2000)). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)). 
78. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Sue on Pay: Say on Pay’s Impact on Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 55 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (2013). 
79. Id. at 5. 
80. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010). 
81. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(a) (2011). 
82. Id. 
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corporations to give shareholders an advisory vote on the frequency of the say-
on-pay vote and on so-called “golden parachute” severance packages following 
mergers or acquisitions.83 
The say-on-pay provision was hotly debated in Congress, with critics 
voicing concerns about governmental intrusion into the boardroom and about 
hampering companies’ ability to attract top talent.84 Proponents of the provision 
voiced a general concern that executive compensation had become too high 
across all firms and emphasized their view that the shareholder vote would help 
stop the upward trend in CEO pay.85 The policy debate on say on pay in the 
United States evidenced that its supporters expected that it would constrain 
general executive compensation levels and help slow the overall rate of 
compensation growth.86 
So, has U.S. say-on-pay legislation achieved these goals? In the next two 
Subsections, I answer this question in the negative by citing findings showing 
that say on pay has not had a significant observable effect on overall 
compensation levels (Subsection II.B.1) and that say-on-pay voting patterns are 
most strongly linked to shareholder returns (Subsection II.B.2). 
1. Say on Pay Has Not Had a Significant Effect on Executive 
Compensation Growth 
Studies analyzing executive-compensation packages since mandatory say-
on-pay voting became effective overwhelmingly indicate that say on pay has 
failed to slow the growth in executive-compensation levels in the United States. 
A 2018 EPI report finds that average executive pay levels have climbed 
steadily since the initiation of say-on-pay voting in 2011.87 While CEO pay 
levels have not yet returned to the record highs of the early 2000s, average 
executive-compensation payouts have grown consistently since 2009, with a 
17.6% gain in average compensation based on options realized just between 
2016 and 2017.88 The academic commentary on the first years of say on pay 
 
83. Dodd-Frank Act § 951. 
84. See Randall S. Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter & James F. Cotter, Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: 
Will it Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213, 
1236 (2012). 
85. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 110-88, at 3 (2007) which notes that median CEO pay had grown 
to $13.5 million during the 2005 fiscal year at the 1,400 largest U.S. public companies). 
86. Randall S. Thomas & Christoph Van der Elst, Say on Pay Around the World, 92 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 653, 729 (2015). 





echoes this finding.89 As recent executive compensation figures demonstrate, 
this trend continued into 2017 and 2018.90 
Much of the scholarly commentary blames highly deferential shareholder 
voting as partially responsible for the lackluster effects of say-on-pay voting in 
the United States. Voting data gathered by the private research firm Proxy 
Insight supports this view, showing that the average percentage of shareholders 
voting for executive compensation packages at S&P 500 companies (rather 
than voting against or abstaining) is 91.7%.91 
2. Say on Pay is a Vote on Firm Financial Performance 
Several notable studies have concluded that shareholder “against” votes 
on executive compensation are highly correlated with poor firm financial 
performance, with shareholders only voting against pay packages at seriously 
underperforming firms.92 A recent study reveals that share returns impact 
shareholder say-on-pay votes, independent of actual executive pay levels. 
Professors Jill Fisch, Darius Palia, and Steven Davidoff Solomon studied the 
effect of executive pay level, sensitivity of pay relative to economic 
performance, and economic performance on say-on-pay vote outcomes and 
found that, after controlling for executive pay level and pay sensitivity, firm 
performance (and thus shareholder return) still has a “substantial effect” on 
vote outcomes.93 Consistent with earlier academic analysis, Fisch, Palia, and 
Solomon further find that “shareholders do not appear to care about executive 
compensation unless an issuer is performing badly.”94 This is a troubling result, 
 
89. Peter Iliev & Svetla Vitanova, The Effect of the Say-on-Pay Vote in the U.S., in 
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 4451 (2019); Vincente Cuñat, Mireia Giné & Maria Guadalupe, Say Pays! 
Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance, 20 REV. OF FIN. 1799 (2015). 
90. See supra Section I.B; Jacob Rund, Pay Raises for U.S. CEOs Trend Toward 7-Year High, 




91. S&P500 SoP Voting 2018, PAY TRACKER, PROXY INSIGHT (June 22, 2018) (on file with 
author). 
92. TED ALLEN ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., PRELIMINARY 2011 U.S 
POSTSEASON REPORT 2 (2011) (cited in Thomas, Palmiter & Cotter, supra note 86, at 1248-49); Joseph 
E. Bachelder III, Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. 
(Sept. 17, 2011), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/09/17/say-on-pay-under-dodd-frank 
[https://perma.cc/F8UK-NF8H]; Thomas, Palmiter & Cotter, supra note 84, at 1216; see also VOTING 
ANALYTICS: AN ANALYSIS OF VOTING RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE AT RUSSELL 3000 COMPANIES, 
EQUILAR 1 (July 2011), http://www.shareholderforum.com/sop/Library/20110728%20Equilar%20-
%20Voting%20Analytics%20-
%20An%20Analysis%20of%20Voting%20Results%20and%20Performance%20at%20Russell%203000
%20Companies.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KCZ-25C5] (finding that, of the 38 Russell 3000 companies with 
negative say-on-pay votes in 2011, 73% were below the median total shareholder return for 2011). 
93. Jill Fisch, Darius Palia & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Is Say on Pay All About Pay? The 
Impact of Firm Performance, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101, 101 (2018). 
94. Id. 
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given that legislators and other proponents of say on pay had hoped it would 
dampen growth in executive compensation levels across all companies. 
In the years since the Dodd-Frank say-on-pay provision came into effect, 
an ample body of scholarship has explored whether the policy has succeeded.95 
Most of this scholarship concludes that say on pay has not yet had a significant 
observable effect on executive-compensation levels for most U.S. public 
companies, with highly deferential say-on-pay votes for the vast majority of 
companies.96 Some scholars, however, posit that say-on-pay votes may 
incentivize boards of directors to preemptively limit executive compensation 
awards in order to avoid a negative say-on-pay vote.97 If this disciplining effect 
exists, it is likely small, because executive compensation levels have risen 
steadily since say on pay’s enactment.98 Other scholars find that, while say on 
pay has only a minor effect on executive salary levels, it positively impacts 
shareholder value, incentivizing executives to improve their firm’s performance 
in anticipation of the shareholder say-on-pay vote.99 But this potential benefit is 
unlikely to ameliorate income inequality because it delivers enhanced value 
only to shareholders, a group that is already overwhelmingly wealthy.100 
C. CEO-Median Worker Pay Ratio Disclosure: Will It Work? 
In August 2015, the SEC adopted a rule pursuant to Section 953(b) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act amending Item 402 of Regulation S-K to “require disclosure 
of the median of the annual total compensation of all employees of a registrant 
(excluding the chief executive officer), the annual total compensation of that 
registrant’s chief executive officer,” and the ratio of the two figures under 
newly added Item 402(u).101 The final rule was adopted by a 3-2 Commission 
 
95. See, e.g., James F. Cotter et al., The First Year of Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank: An 
Empirical Analysis and Look Forward, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 967 (2013); Fisch, Palia & Solomon, 
supra note 93; Thomas, Palmiter & Cotter, supra note 84; Thomas & Van der Elst, supra note 86. 
96. See Fisch, Palia & Solomon, supra note 93, at 102 (“Issuers have now experienced five 
years of say on pay votes, and the effect of the provision remains heavily debated. Although 
shareholders at a few issuers have rejected compensation plans, shareholders at the overwhelming 
majority of issuers vote to approve executive compensation, and the average percentage of votes in favor 
exceeds 90%. The link between say on pay and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation is unclear-
CEO pay continued to rise for the first several years after Dodd-Frank, declined in 2015, and rose to 
record levels in 2016.”); see also Cotter et al., supra note 95, at 970; Thomas, Palmiter & Cotter, supra 
note 84, at 1216; Thomas & Van der Elst, supra note 86, at 661-662. 
97. See, e.g., Cotter et al., supra note 95, at 970 (“[M]andatory say on pay seems to have 
encouraged management to be more responsive to shareholder concerns about executive pay and 
corporate governance.”). 
98. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. 
99. See Cuñat, Giné & Guadalupe, supra note 89 at 4-5. 
100. See infra notes 117-119 and accompanying text. 
101. See Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,103 (Aug. 18, 2015) (amending 17 C.F.R. pts. 




vote after a series of delays that drew ire from Senator Warren102 and others.103 
Despite much press attention when the rule became effective for all companies 
on January 1, 2017, it is unclear that shareholders have taken much notice of 
the new disclosure.104 Furthermore, as I explain in Part III, there is evidence 
indicating that additional executive compensation disclosures are not 
meaningful to investors.105 
III. Do Shareholders Understand and Care About Executive Compensation? 
This Part argues that the failure of shareholder-focused executive-
compensation laws to constrain executive pay levels should not be surprising, 
because shareholders, dispersed geographically, possess neither the capacity 
nor the incentives to effectively limit executive pay. I extend the implications 
of several recent studies that have provided greater insight into shareholder 
behavior and demographics. This Part applies, for the first time, these studies’ 
findings to say-on-pay voting by dispersed U.S. shareholders and asserts that 1) 
shareholders do not understand executive compensation disclosures (Section 
III.A); 2) shareholders do not care strongly about levels of executive 
compensation at the firms in which they invest and instead care only about 
investment returns (Section III.B); and 3) shareholders are disincentivized to 
vote against pay packages at firms that are succeeding in the market, for fear of 
how a negative vote could affect the firm’s stock price (Section III.C). Lastly, 
Section IV.D argues that, in addition to being ineffective, say-on-pay voting 
potentially worsens economic inequality by “ratifying” high pay and promoting 
short-termism and excessive risk-taking by corporate managers. 
A. Shareholders Do Not Adequately Understand Executive Compensation 
In this Section, I draw on the findings of a recent study of say-on-pay 
voting in the United Kingdom to assert that U.S. shareholders likely do not 
 
102. See Letter from Senator Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senate, to Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 21 (calling on Commissioner White to finalize and adopt the pay 
ratio disclosure rule). 
103. See, e.g., Senators Weigh in on CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratio Rule During SEC Public 
Comment Period, SEN. BOB MENENDEZ FOR NEW JERSEY (Nov. 26, 2013), 
https://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/senators-weigh-in-on-ceo-to-worker-pay-
ratio-rule-during-sec-public-comment-period [https://perma.cc/MP7A-TERC] (describing the efforts of 
13 Democrat senators to persuade the SEC to finalize the pay-ratio disclosure rule in a timely manner). 
104. See, e.g., American Firms Reveal the Gulf Between Bosses’ and Workers’ Pay, THE 
ECONOMIST (May 29, 2018), https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/05/29/american-firms-
reveal-the-gulf-between-bosses-and-workers-pay [https://perma.cc/FMC4-DBHQ]; Anders Melin, 
American CEO Pay is Soaring, But the Gender Pay Gap is Drawing the Rage, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 21, 2018, 5:00 AM EST), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-
21/american-ceo-pay-is-soaring-but-the-gender-pay-gap-is-drawing-the-rage [https://perma.cc/MMS9-
H2B3] (reporting that CEO-worker pay ratio disclosures have not received significant attention from 
investors, particularly in comparison to corporate #MeToo scandals). 
105. See infra Section III.A. 
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adequately understand executive-compensation disclosures. Extending the 
study’s findings to the U.S. context, this Section argues that these findings 
undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of say-on-pay voting and enhanced 
executive compensation disclosures such as CEO-median worker pay ratio 
disclosure. 
Scholarship in the field of comparative corporate governance often uses 
policy outcomes in the United Kingdom to predict how similar policies might 
function in the United States, and vice versa.106 Such cross-country comparison 
is sometimes ill-advised due to significant cultural and institutional differences 
between countries. Corporate-governance scholars generally consider the 
United States and the United Kingdom to have quite similar corporate 
governance landscapes due to the prevalence of dispersed share ownership in 
both countries, however, making U.K.-U.S. policy comparison more likely to 
offer meaningful insights.107 
A 2018 study of say-on-pay voting behavior in the United Kingdom by 
Professors Gerner-Beuerle and Kirchmaier indicates that dispersed 
shareholders often base their votes on a faulty understanding of executive-
compensation disclosures, and institutional shareholders generally rely on 
proxy advisory firms.108 Gerner-Beuerle and Kirchmaier “do not find any 
evidence that [shareholders] assess the structure of a company’s remuneration 
policy comprehensively.”109 The study further finds that shareholders primarily 
base their votes on the amount of remuneration received by the CEO in the 
previous year and the CEO’s total remuneration opportunity in the next year, 
both highly incomplete measures of companies’ executive compensation 
policies.110 The total remuneration received figure excludes the often-
substantial deferred remuneration awarded to the CEO, and the CEO’s total 
remuneration opportunity is an imprecise indicator of what the executive can 
actually expect to receive, as it is the merely the highest end of a wide range of 
possible payouts.111 These results should not lead to the conclusion that 
shareholders care about limiting top-level pay generally. Rather, these findings 
show that in deciding whether to vote “for” or “against” executive pay 
packages, shareholders primarily rely on imprecise and incomplete indicators 
of executives’ total compensation awards.112 
 
106. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Say on Pay: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and 
the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323 (2009) (using the UK experience with Say 
on Pay to predict how Say on Pay will fare in the United States); Thomas & Van der Elst, supra note 86 
(same). 
107. Luca Enriques et al., Shareholder Interests, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW (John 
Armour ed., 3d ed. 2017). 
108. Carsten Gerner-Beuerle & Tom Kirchmaier, Say on Pay: Do Shareholders Care? (ECGI 
Working Paper No. 579, 2018). 
109. Id. at 1. 
110. Id. at 4. 
111. Id. at 4-5. 




Applied to the United States, these findings suggest that shareholder say-
on-pay voting may often be underinformed. If shareholders are poorly informed 
about executive-compensation policies, it seems less likely that they will be 
able to use say-on-pay voting to exert meaningful influence on these policies. 
These findings further cast doubt on whether enhanced executive compensation 
disclosures—most pertinently CEO-median worker pay ratio disclosure—better 
enable shareholders to discipline corporations for excessive executive pay. If 
shareholders do not process additional compensation disclosures and 
incorporate this information into their voting and stock ownership decisions, it 
seems unlikely that further enhancements of disclosure regulations will lead to 
additional constraints on executive compensation. 
B. Shareholders Lack the Incentives to Care About High Executive Pay 
In this Section, I draw on research analyzing the socioeconomic 
characteristics of American shareholders to assert that U.S. shareholders lack 
adequate incentives to constrain high executive compensation. Since the rise of 
equity ownership by middle- and working-class families through defined-
contribution plans in the 1970s, a greater portion of American households have 
owned some publicly traded shares,113 creating a perception that the 
shareholder class is representative of the American public.114 Given the 
established connection between rising executive compensation and growing 
economic inequality, if shareholders were in fact representative of the 
American public, then at least some shareholders would be motivated to control 
executive compensation levels, because high executive pay contributes to the 
dynamic that has depressed income growth for all income brackets below the 
top 10%.115 If shareholders are typically members of the top 10% of wealth 
holders, however, they will not be personally harmed by economic inequality, 
and thus will only be motivated to limit executive compensation to the extent it 
hurts their investment returns. According to the Efficient Capital Markets 
Hypothesis, the amount of executive compensation paid out by a public 
company is already incorporated into the stock price paid by the shareholder, so 
unless there is an unexpected increase in the company’s total executive 
compensation while the shareholder owns the shares,116 the shareholder’s return 
will not be negatively impacted. Shareholders in the top 10% will thus not be 
 
113. See Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 911, 911 (2013). 
114. Id. 
115. See discussion supra Part I. This reasoning rests on the assumption that for some 
hypothetical group of shareholders below a certain income level, the potential benefits of constraining 
income inequality would outweigh the potential costs of harming the company’s stock returns. 
116. Robert J. Rhee, Intrafirm Monitoring of Executive Compensation, 69 VAND. L. REV. 695, 
734 (2016). Unexpected increases in compensation would likely only cause shareholders to discipline 
boards in the rare case that total compensation payouts unexpectedly increase, and the firm performs 
worse than or just as expected, leading to a net decrease in the stock price. 
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personally incentivized to constrain high executive compensation absent an 
unexpected compensation increase. 
A recent 2013 study confirms that the vast majority of U.S. public 
company shares are held by the wealthiest 10% of American households,117 
finding that in 2007 the top 10% of U.S. wealth holders owned 81% of U.S.-
public-company shares, with the top 1% owning 38%. The bottom 80% of 
wealth holders owned only 9% of U.S.-public-company shares.118 Even as 
public stock ownership has “diffused downward,” this trend has done “nothing 
to erode the percentage share of the top ten percent of households.”119 
Given that 81% of U.S. public company shares are held by the wealthiest 
10% of households, and this top 10% lacks incentives to constrain executive 
compensation merely because it is excessive, it seems unlikely that significant 
numbers of shareholders will vote against high pay packages absent poor 
shareholder returns. This theory is supported by say-on-pay voting data, which 
shows that 91.7% of voting shareholders on average vote for executive pay 
packages, and that shareholders only vote against executive compensation 
when the company has performed poorly in the market.120 
C. Shareholders Are Reluctant to Vote “Against” Due to Expected Market 
Response 
In addition to the fact that shareholders lack sufficient incentive to vote 
against excessive compensation packages, shareholders may be disincentivized 
from voting against say-on-pay proposals for fear that the announcement of a 
low say-on-pay vote could negatively affect the market price of their shares. A 
recent paper studying the behavior of institutional investors provides evidence 
of this dynamic: Schwartz-Ziv and Wermers conducted an events study to 
observe the market reaction to the announcement of a low say-on-pay vote 
result (i.e., where a significant percentage of shareholders voted against the 
company’s executive compensation packages).121 The authors found that the 
market responds negatively to the announcement of a low say-on-pay vote.122 
This finding further explains why shareholders may be reluctant to vote against 
 
117. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489, 490 (2013). 
118. Id. at 518. 
119. Id. at 510, 518. 
120. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
121. Miriam Schwartz-Ziv & Russ Wermers, Do Institutional Investors Monitor Their Large 
vs. Small Investments Differently? Evidence from the Say-On-Pay Vote (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst. Working 
Paper No. 541, 2018). 
122. Id. at 3 (“We find that the announcements of low support rates are indeed followed by 
negative cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). For example, during a nine-day event window around the 
vote (-4,+4), the average abnormal return across companies that receive SOP support rates below 70% is 





corporate compensation packages: a low vote could hurt the market value of 
their shares. 
D. Say on Pay Potentially Contributes to Economic Inequality 
As established in Parts II and III, there is significant reason to believe that 
say-on-pay legislation is an ineffective regulator of rising executive 
compensation in the United States. Is it a harmful policy, though? In this 
Section, I argue that, yes, say on pay does have the potential to contribute to 
economic inequality. For one, a favorable say-on-pay vote may act as an 
informal “ratifying” mechanism for massive executive pay packages.123 A 
highly deferential say-on-pay vote may diminish the power of the so-called 
“outrage constraint.”124 Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (themselves 
supporters of say on pay and other shareholder-power-enhancing policies) 
famously posited that in the absence of strong mechanisms for shareholders to 
regulate executive compensation, executive pay may still be constrained by the 
“outrage” of the general public when they perceive an executive pay award to 
be “unjustified” or “egregious.”125 Favorable say-on-pay voting may defuse 
potential outrage over high corporate pay awards, limiting the public’s ability 
to act as an external constraint on executive-compensation growth. 
Say-on-pay voting could also promote short-termism and excessive risk-
taking by corporate managers. As Fisch, Palia, and Solomon assert, because 
shareholder say-on-pay voting outcomes are highly correlated with the 
company’s short-term stock performance, executives may feel pressure to 
maximize short-term stock price instead of investing in long-term value 
creation.126 The authors further argue that say-on-pay voting could promote 
excessive risk-taking by corporate managers trying to maximize their 
respective companies’ short-term stock price.127 Most shareholders will be 
 
123. This is not a claim that say-on-pay voting can act as shareholder ratification for the 
purposes of state fiduciary-duty law (and, indeed, section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act expressly provides 
that the shareholder vote does not “create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties” of the issuer or its 
board). Dodd-Frank Act § 951(c). 
124. Professor Minor Myers was the first to make this argument. See Minor Myers, The Perils 
of Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 417, 421 (2011) (arguing that 
shareholder voting on executive compensation may “cloud[] the functioning of the outrage constraint”). 
125. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 65 (2004); see Paul Krugman, Opinion, The Outrage 
Constraint, N.Y. TIMES (August 23, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/23/opinion/the-outrage-
constraint.html [https://perma.cc/9NCZ-3E62] (describing Bebchuck & Fried’s outrage constraint 
theory); see also Kym Maree Sheehan, Is the Outrage Constraint an Effective Constraint on Executive 
Remuneration? Evidence from the UK and Preliminary Results from Australia (Working Paper, 2007) 
(on file with author) (discussing Bebchuk & Fried’s theory at length). 
126. Fisch, Palia & Solomon, supra note 93, at 126. 
127. Id. at 127. 
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sufficiently diversified to bear this risk,128 but other stakeholders—such as 
workers, local community members, and society—could be harmed.129 
IV. The Progressive Stakeholder Primacy Movement: Can It Solve American 
Economic Inequality? 
In this Part, I engage in the first academic analysis of the emerging 
progressive stakeholder-primacy movement’s executive compensation policy 
proposals. A strong stakeholder-primacy approach to executive compensation 
would avoid the pitfalls of the United States’ current executive compensation 
laws by eschewing reliance on shareholders to discipline corporate boards in 
their compensation decisions. As the discussion in Parts II and III has shown, 
policies that rely on enhanced disclosures and shareholder participation to 
constrain executive compensation have failed in the past and will likely 
continue to fail, because shareholders lack both the ability to adequately 
understand compensation disclosures and the incentives to discipline corporate 
compensation policies.130 Laws that target compensation levels only indirectly, 
such as by limiting tax deductibility, or laws that target only one form of 
compensation are also unlikely to succeed, as the history of Section 162(m) has 
demonstrated.131 Thus an effective stakeholder-primacy approach to executive-
compensation regulation would directly restrain the board of directors in their 
pay-setting practices for all forms of executive compensation. 
Progressive stakeholder primacy has enormous potential to address rising 
economic inequality, but, as established in Parts I, II, and III of this Note, it will 
not do so sufficiently without strong policies specifically targeting executive 
compensation. My analysis finds that several of the movement’s policy 
proposals have potential to address executive pay, but that progressive 
politicians have not yet articulated a strong vision for effectively controlling 
executive compensation growth. This finding is unexpected and inconsistent 
with these politicians’ stated concern with corporate excess and its contribution 
to economic inequality. 
I begin in Section IV.A with the contemporary scholarly debate over 
whether corporate managers should primarily serve shareholders or also serve 
the interests of other stakeholders: workers, consumers, local communities, and 
society as a whole. In Section IV.B, I document stakeholder primacy’s recent 
emergence in U.S. politics, led by congressional Democrats such as Elizabeth 
 
128. See id. 
129. Notably, the risk-taking incentive described could result in broader systemic harms which 
hurt the value of even diversified shareholders’ portfolios by negatively impacting all firms. See John 
Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 35 
(2014). However, as Fisch, Palia, and Solomon’s analysis suggests, it does not seem that this risk is 
sufficiently salient to shareholders to alter their voting behavior. See Fisch, Palia & Solomon, supra note 
93, at 127. 
130. See supra Parts II and III. 




Warren, Bernie Sanders, Chuck Schumer, Tammy Baldwin, and Cory Booker. I 
analyze several of these politicians’ proposed executive-pay-related policies 
and find that they would not effectively limit executive-compensation payouts. 
In Section IV.C, I turn to Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act and 
analyze several of its provisions, explaining why they would not effectively 
constrain executive compensation growth either. 
A. The Contemporary Scholarly Debate: Stout v. Bebchuk 
As discussed in the Introduction, shareholder primacy began as a 
somewhat revolutionary, conservative rethinking of the corporate purpose in 
the 1970s and became the dominant theory through the 1980s and 90s. In the 
early 2000s, shareholder-focused policies were adopted en masse by Democrats 
as an asserted tool to discipline the corruption and excess of corporate 
managers, particularly by constraining executive compensation.132 Professor 
Lucian Bebchuk (along with frequent co-author Jesse Fried) authored a body of 
scholarship that aimed to rein in executive pay policies by enhancing 
shareholders’ power to influence and control management.133 This work 
asserted that the corporation should not only primarily serve shareholders (the 
traditional shareholder primacy view), but also that shareholders should have 
more control over corporate management.134 
According to Bebchuk, the problem with executive pay is “board 
capture”—a dynamic whereby executives wield significant influence over 
boards of directors and compromise arm’s-length bargaining, allowing them to 
secure highly lucrative pay packages untethered from any measure of 
performance.135 The solution, according to Bebchuk and his co-authors is 
corporate governance reform that makes boards “more accountable to 
shareholders.”136 Bebchuk’s ideas were often cited by U.S. political proponents 
of say on pay, including President Barack Obama.137 
 
132. See supra Introduction. 
133. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 125; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. 
Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69. U. CHI. 
L. REV. 751 (2002); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency 
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 71 (2003); Lucian A Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, 
The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Sterns & Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON 
REG. 257 (2010); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Banker’s Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247 
(2010). 
134. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
833 (2005); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 98 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007); 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015). 
135. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 125, at ix. 
136. Id. at 2. 
137. See, e.g., Obama Imposes Limits on Executive Pay, NBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2009, 8:13 PM 
EST), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/29003620/ns/business-us_business/t/obama-imposes-limits-
executive-pay [https://perma.cc/N2TP-NZDL] (“‘This is America. We don’t disparage wealth. We don’t 
begrudge anybody for achieving success,’ Obama said. ‘But what gets people upset—and rightfully 
so—are executives being rewarded for failure. Especially when those rewards are subsidized by U.S. 
taxpayers.’”). 
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While Bebchuk represents the majority view in American legal 
academia,138 he has long had two sets of critics. One set, led by Professor 
Stephen Bainbridge, argues that U.S. corporate law empowers the board of 
directors to make most decisions for the company unilaterally because this 
system is more efficient.139 Bainbridge calls this view “director primacy.”140 
The other, spearheaded by Professor Lynn Stout, asserts that rather than solely 
existing to maximize shareholder value, corporations must serve the interests of 
a broad range of stakeholders—consumers, workers, local communities, and 
society—in addition to promoting the interests of shareholders.141 From a 
policy perspective, argues Stout, shareholder primacy simply does not work: it 
harms society and also, ironically, hinders shareholder value by focusing on 
short-term returns at the expense of long-term development.142 
From a legal perspective, shareholder primacy is not actually law. For 
one, shareholders do not actually “own” the corporation—the corporation is a 
legal entity that owns itself.143 Further, outside of bankruptcy, shareholders are 
not actually the residual claimants on the corporation’s profits.144 Finally, the 
relationship between shareholders and directors is not, in fact, a principal-agent 
relationship, because shareholders do not have the legal authority to control 
directors.145 The best corporate-governance approach, Stout maintains, is one 
that empowers the board to sufficiently promote the interests of all 
stakeholders, rather than making directors beholden solely to shareholders.146 
B. The Emerging Progressive Stakeholder Primacy Movement 
Though shareholder primacy maintains a stronghold in the academy, 
Stout’s theory of stakeholder primacy is swiftly gaining ground in U.S. 
politics.147 In just the past year, in addition to Senator Warren’s Accountable 
 
138. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 
89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (asserting that corporate law around the world is converging toward shareholder 
primacy, and arguing that shareholder primacy’s widespread success is warranted); Jonathan Macey, 
Sublime Myths: An Essay in Honor of the Shareholder Value Myth and the Tooth Fairy, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
911 (2013) (reviewing Lynn Stout’s “The Shareholder Value Myth” and arguing for shareholder 
primacy theory). 
139. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE, Preface (2008). 
140. Id. 
141. See LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS 
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012). 
142. Id. at 8-9. 
143. Id. at 8. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 10-11. 
147. Based on significant recent developments, it also seems that stakeholder primacy is 
making headway in U.S. business culture. In August 2019, the Business Roundtable issued a new 
Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, signed by 181 CEOs committing “to lead their companies 
for the benefit of all stakeholders—customers, employees, suppliers, communities and shareholders.” 




Capitalism Act, congressional Democrats have introduced four major 
legislative proposals that would require corporate boards to better balance the 
interests of stakeholders with those of shareholders. Across the aisle, 
Republican Senator Marco Rubio (FL) recently introduced his own 
stakeholder-oriented policy proposal. 
This Section makes several findings about the emerging stakeholder 
primacy movement’s policy proposals. First, the policies themselves and the 
rhetoric used to promote them indicate that prominent Democrat politicians are 
swiftly abandoning shareholder primacy in favor of stakeholder primacy. 
Marco Rubio’s adoption of similar policies and rhetoric could indicate 
that more conservatives will move toward stakeholder-oriented politics. 
Second, while these policy proposals contain provisions designed to address 
executive compensation indirectly, only one proposal contains a provision that 
places direct limits on executive compensation. Perplexingly, this provision 
was dropped in a more recent version of the legislation. Third, as asserted 
throughout this Section, the proposed indirect limits on executive compensation 
are unlikely to be effective. Stakeholder primacy progressivism’s inability to 
control executive compensation would be a critical failure for economic 
inequality, because, as economists such as Piketty, Saez, and Stiglitz have 
established, executive compensation is a key driver of economic inequality in 
the United States.148 This Section discusses and analyzes each of these policy 
proposals individually before turning to a more extensive analysis of Warren’s 
Accountable Capitalism Act in the next Section. 
1. The Stop WALMART Act 
In November 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Representative Ro 
Khanna (D-CA) introduced the Stop WALMART Act.149 The legislation would 
prohibit companies with over 500 employees from initiating stock buybacks 
unless they adopt a set of worker-protective policies.150 In order for companies 
covered by the bill to engage in share buybacks, they would need to 1) pay all 
employees at least $15 per hour, 2) allow employees to earn up to seven days of 
paid sick leave, and 3) maintain a CEO-median employee pay ratio no higher 
than 150.151 The Stop WALMART Act contains several promising provisions 
 
Americans”, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-
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[https://perma.cc/M94M-LVAS]. 
148. See supra Section I.C. 
149. See Stop WALMART (Welfare for Any Large Monopoly Amassing Revenue from 
Taxpayers) Act of 2018, S. 3410, 115th Cong. (2018). 
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that could help address economic inequality, but, save for the pay-ratio cap, 
would not effectively limit executive compensation. Notably, in a more 
recently announced, broader-focused version of the Stop WALMART Act, 
discussed in Subsection IV.B.2, Senator Sanders appears to have dropped the 
pay-ratio-cap provision. 
Limiting stock buybacks could, in theory, help reduce corporate payouts 
to shareholders and executives. Corporate stock buybacks contribute to 
economic inequality by enriching shareholders and corporate executives (who 
generally own a significant equity stake in their company due to stock-based 
compensation) while depriving workers, consumers, and communities of 
economic value.152 Many think that corporate managers are motivated to 
promote stock buybacks due to the incentive structures built into their 
compensation packages, which often award higher payouts for meeting certain 
share-related benchmarks, such as earnings per share, return on equity, and 
share price.153 These performance measures typically improve following a 
stock buyback, because the company’s earnings are distributed among fewer 
outstanding shares.154 Corporate share buybacks surged in 2018, likely because 
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act lowered corporate tax rates, freeing up corporate 
funds to buy back additional stock.155 
Limitations on stock buybacks, however, are unlikely to significantly 
constrain corporate payouts to executives. For one, corporations have other 
ways to distribute funds to executives that would not be hindered by the 
proposed stock-buyback limitation. Corporations could respond by paying 
higher dividends to shareholders—using the same funds to enrich shareholders 
over time rather than buying them out.156 While higher dividends might be 
superior to share buybacks because they reward long-term shareholders, they 
would still funnel corporate funds to shareholders and executives rather than 
 
152. Under this theory, the funds that corporations use to purchase their stock from 
shareholders could instead be used to pay employees higher wages, lower the prices or improve the 
quality of goods, or engage in long-term investment. See Lenore Palladino, The $1 Trillion Question: 
New Approaches to Regulating Stock Buybacks, 36 YALE J. ON REG. BULLETIN (2018), 
http://yalejreg.com/the-1-trillion-question-new-approaches-to-regulating-stock-buybacks 
[https://perma.cc/9T2U-BE3L]. 
153. See James Reda, How Stock Buybacks Can Affect Executive Compensation, COLUM. L. 
SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (Aug. 3, 2018), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/08/03/how-stock-
buybacks-can-affect-executive-compensation [https://perma.cc/5YRJ-XH4B]. 
154. Id. 
155. Anne Marie Knott, Why the Tax Cuts And Jobs Act (TCJA) Led To Buybacks Rather 
Than Investment, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2019, 4:47 PM), 
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investing their money elsewhere. Additionally, some dividends are taxed at ordinary-income tax rates 
(though many are taxed at capital-gains rates), while proceeds from buybacks are always taxed at the 
lower capital gains rates. See, e.g., Dylan Scott & Emily Stewart, Marco Rubio’s Plan to Fix the GOP 






investing these funds in workers and long-term growth. Corporate management 
might also respond to share-buyback limitations by paying a greater portion of 
executive compensation in cash rather than equity. 
More fundamentally, excessive and poorly designed executive 
compensation packages incentivize stock buybacks, but it is not clear that the 
causal connection runs the other way.157 As discussed above, stock buybacks 
are just one way for corporate executives to ensure that they can easily reap the 
benefits of excessive pay. While reducing equity compensation and amending 
performance-based incentive compensation triggers could reduce incentives for 
corporate executives to promote share buybacks, it does not follow that limiting 
stock buybacks would result in lower executive compensation levels. 
The proposed $15 minimum wage and mandatory employee benefits 
could also help address economic inequality. Undoubtedly, higher worker 
wages and greater benefits are a key component of any comprehensive plan to 
resolve economic inequality in the United States. It is not clear, however, that 
these measures would result in lower executive compensation payouts. 
Walmart’s January 2018 wage increase provides an example of how large 
corporations could respond to pressure to raise worker wages. In early 2018, 
Walmart announced that it would raise entry-level wages to $11 per hour, but 
on the same day announced that it would close 63 of its Sam’s Club stores and 
lay off thousands of workers.158 Walmart did not reduce its executive 
compensation payouts in fiscal year 2018 and in fact paid its executives larger 
bonuses than they were set to receive under the terms of their publicly 
disclosed incentive compensation policies.159 This example, though merely 
anecdotal, shows that higher worker wages will not necessarily lead to lower 
executive compensation. 
The pay-ratio cap provision is the only policy that has been proposed as 
part of the progressive stakeholder primacy movement that would impose a 
direct limitation on corporate boards in setting executive compensation. As Part 
V asserts, the pay-ratio cap has strong potential to directly limit executive 
compensation levels.160 Troublingly, Senator Sanders seems to have dropped 
the pay-ratio cap from a planned bill that would extend the proposals of the 
 
157. One industry commentator has made a similar argument, describing the proposed 
limitations on stock buybacks as addressing the “symptoms” but not the “disease.” Roger L. Martin, 
Stock Buybacks Are a Problem But the Sanders-Schumer Solution Is Not the Answer, BARRON’S (Feb. 7, 
2019, 8:00 AM EST), https://www.barrons.com/articles/stock-buybacks-ban-wont-fix-the-problem-
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REUTERS (Jan. 11, 2018, 8:10 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-walmart-wages/walmart-hikes-
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BLOOMBERG (Apr. 25, 2018, 4:07 PM EST), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-
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160. See infra Section V.A. 
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Stop WALMART Act to a broader set of companies, discussed in the next 
Section. 
2. Senator Bernie Sanders’s and Senator Chuck Schumer’s Corporate 
Stock Buyback Bill 
In early February 2019, senators Bernie Sanders and Chuck Schumer (D – 
NY) announced planned legislation161 to prohibit corporations from buying 
back their own stock unless they “invest[] in workers and communities first, 
including things like paying all workers at least $15 an hour, providing seven 
days of paid sick leave, and offering decent pensions and more reliable health 
benefits.”162 Perplexingly, the proposal includes all of the major provisions of 
the Stop WALMART Act except for the CEO-median worker pay ratio cap. As 
discussed above in Subsection IV.B.1, the pay-ratio cap is the only proposed 
provision that would impose effective, direct limits on executive compensation 
levels. 
Another striking aspect of this proposal is the rhetoric Sanders and 
Schumer have used to contextualize it. In announcing the proposal, Sanders and 
Schumer framed it as a sharp rejection of shareholder primacy, parroting much 
of the language Senator Warren used six months before in announcing the 
Accountable Capitalism Act: 
 
From the mid‐20th century until the 1970s, American corporations shared a 
belief that they had a duty not only to their shareholders but to their workers, 
their communities and the country that created the economic conditions and 
legal protections for them to thrive. . . . But over the past several decades, 
corporate boardrooms have become obsessed with maximizing only shareholder 
earnings to the detriment of workers and the long‐term strength of their 
companies, helping to create the worst level of income inequality in decades.163 
 
This rhetoric is especially remarkable because neither politician has ever 
articulated this view of shareholder primacy before. Senator Sanders, though he 
has focused much of his political career on addressing income inequality, 
corporate greed, and the need for corporate social responsibility,164 has never 
before taken a stated position on shareholder primacy. Senator Schumer, 
notably, was an outspoken advocate for shareholder power not even a decade 
 
161. As of August 19, 2019, Senators Sanders and Schumer had not yet introduced this 
legislation nor released a draft of the bill. 
162. See Schumer & Sanders, supra note 22. 
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ago. As discussed in the Introduction, in 2009, Schumer introduced the 
Shareholder Bill of Rights Act,165 which included a suite of shareholder-power-
enhancing policies, including say on pay, mandatory proxy-statement 
disclosure of golden-parachute arrangements, and shareholder-friendly proxy 
access rules.166 The anti-shareholder-primacy rhetoric used by Senators Sanders 
and Schumer, as well as Schumer’s sudden change in position on shareholder 
primacy, indicates that progressive stakeholder primacy is swiftly gaining 
political traction. 
3. The Reward Work Act 
In March 2018, Senator Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) introduced the Reward 
Work Act,167 which would “improve[] disclosure of [stock] repurchases and 
require[] public companies to give workers the right to directly elect one-third 
of their company’s board of directors.”168 Senator Baldwin also explicitly 
targeted shareholder primacy in discussing the bill, asserting that corporate 
profits overwhelmingly go to “wealthy shareholders” and should instead “be 
shared with the workers who actually create value.”169 In October 2018, 
Senator Baldwin turned her focus to regulatory reform, calling on the SEC to 
consider the merits of directly electing workers to public company boards, and 
“address the obligations of corporations to all of their public stakeholders, 
including employees, consumers, local communities, and taxpayers—in 
addition to public shareholders.”170 
While mandating worker board representation and creating an express 
duty to stakeholders are both reasonable, stakeholder-oriented policy proposals, 
neither would impose strong limits on executive compensation. As discussed 
further in Subsection IV.C.2, evidence from Germany, where worker board 
representation has been mandatory for decades, indicates that this policy would 
likely not result in lower executive compensation levels.171 Additionally, it is 
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far from certain that creating an express duty to stakeholders would promote 
direct constraints on executive pay.172 
4. The Worker Dividend Act 
Also in March 2018, Senators Cory Booker (D-NJ) and Bob Casey (D-
PA) introduced a bill173 requiring U.S. public companies that buy back shares 
to “also pay out a commensurate sum to all of its employees – the ‘workers 
dividend.’”174 Senator Booker targeted shareholder-value maximization and 
short-termism in announcing the Worker Dividend Act: “Today, a culture of 
‘short-termism’ pervades industry and financial markets, as companies 
prioritize short-run returns to investors and executives over investments in 
workers, like higher wages and expanded training, which pay off over the long 
run.”175 But, as asserted in the earlier discussion of the Stop WALMART Act, 
it is uncertain that limiting stock buybacks and increasing payments to workers 
would lead to lower executive compensation payouts.176 
5. Marco Rubio’s Stock Buyback Proposal 
Stakeholder-primacy progressives seem to have gained an unlikely ally in 
Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL). In a December 2018 Atlantic opinion piece,177 
and later in a series of tweets in February 2019,178 announced a plan to correct 
the “tax advantage for buybacks over dividends” by taxing share buyback 
proceeds at ordinary income rates.179 It is debatable whether Senator Rubio’s 
plan would meaningfully alter the incentives for corporations to engage in 
share buybacks over dividend issuances, because many dividends are already 
taxed at the lower capital gains rate.180 
Beyond the merits of Senator Rubio’s plan, the rhetoric he has used to 
argue for it indicates that stakeholder primacy may have bipartisan appeal. In 
his Atlantic piece and subsequent tweets, Senator Rubio repeatedly criticized 
shareholder primacy, implying that shareholder-value maximization deprives 
the economy and workers of economic value: “When a corporation uses its 
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profits to buy back stock, it is actively deciding that returning capital to 
shareholders is a better activity for business than investing in the company’s 
product or workforce,” wrote Senator Rubio in the Atlantic.181 In his tweets, 
Senator Rubio lamented that over the past forty years, “money back to 
shareholders has tripled as a % of our GDP, but investment into business 
dropped by 20%” and cited attorney Martin Lipton, a well-known critic of 
shareholder primacy, for the assertion that companies would rather invest 
earnings in “improving their product [and] improving workers’ skills than 
return it to shareholders.”182 
Senator Rubio has not mentioned executive compensation in his 
discussion of share buybacks, even though many policymakers and analysts 
view executive incentive compensation as a key driver of share buybacks.183 
Senator Rubio’s rhetoric provides evidence that stakeholder-oriented policies to 
address economic inequality could garner bipartisan support in the 2020 
election cycle. 
6. A Note on the “Wealth Tax” 
Progressives have recently proposed policies that would place a higher tax 
burden on America’s wealthiest individuals. Senator Warren would impose an 
annual 2% tax on wealth above $50 million, and an additional 1% surcharge on 
wealth above $1 billion.184 Senator Sanders would expand the estate tax, 
establishing a 45% tax on inherited estates between $3.5 million and $10 
million, and a 50% tax on inherited estates between $10 million and $50 
million.185 Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) has proposed a 
70% marginal tax rate on income above $10 million.186 These tax proposals all 
have promising potential, and any comprehensive plan to address economic 
inequality would be remiss to overlook progressive taxation. However, given 
the potential for tax avoidance and the massive scope of the United States’ 
income and wealth gaps, there is reason to fear that tax-only policies would not 
do enough to correct economic inequality. Further, some progressive policy 
analysts have asserted that laws addressing pre-tax incomes—so-called “pre-
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distribution” policies—are superior to redistributive taxation because they are 
less costly and more politically viable.187 
C. An Analysis of the Accountable Capitalism Act 
In this Section I analyze Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act 
and find that while it contains stakeholder-focused policies with promising 
potential to address some of the ills of shareholder primacy, these policies 
would not amount to effective limits on executive compensation and thus will 
not alone reduce income inequality. As discussed in the Introduction, Senator 
Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act includes three provisions that could be 
viewed as having the potential to rein in executive pay. Most directly, the Act 
would prohibit directors and officers who acquire corporate shares, either by 
purchasing them directly or through equity compensation, from selling these 
shares within five years of acquiring ownership or beneficial ownership of the 
stock, and within three years of a company stock repurchase.188 The Act would 
also impose a requirement that workers elect two-fifths of the board of 
directors.189 Finally, directors and officers would be obligated to balance “the 
pecuniary interests of the shareholders . . . with the best interests of persons that 
are materially affected by the [corporation’s] conduct,” including employees, 
customers, the communities in which the company’s offices and facilities are 
located, and “the local and global environment.”190 
1. Limitations on Executive Stock Sales 
The proposed limitations on executive share sales are a laudable policy 
idea. If executives are required to hold onto shares of their company for a 
longer duration, they will retain personal incentives to promote the company’s 
long-term value. Another likely hoped-for effect of the provision is to 
discourage companies from paying such significant portions of their executive 
compensation in high-value corporate equity by imposing strenuous holding 
period requirements on this equity, thus reducing the overall value of executive 
pay packages. Finally, the provision seems to seek to reduce the attractiveness 
of share buybacks to corporate managers, because beginning on the date of the 
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share buyback, executives would be restricted from selling any company stock 
for three years.191 
The provision’s potential to achieve its goals of discouraging equity 
compensation and corporate stock buybacks, however, is undercut by the 
reality of corporate policies and regulations already constraining executive-
stock sales. This Section’s analysis of the current limitations imposed by large 
public companies and the U.S. securities laws on the sale of shares by 
executives and directors reveals that the proposed provision would not impose 
significantly more stringent limitations than those already in place, making it 
unlikely that this provision would spur changes in executive compensation 
policies or stock buyback decisions.192 These limitations, discussed in turn, 
include 1) company-imposed stock-ownership guidelines, 2) requirements 
attached to restricted stock units, and 3) federal insider trading laws. 
Most large U.S. public companies require their top executives to comply 
with a set of “stock ownership guidelines.”193 These ownership guidelines 
generally require that the executives 1) obtain a specified value of shares within 
a certain timeframe, 2) maintain ownership of at least this specified value of 
shares throughout their executive service, and 3) hold a specified percentage of 
shares and options received as compensation until they accumulate enough 
shares to fulfill the ownership guidelines.194 The stated purpose of these 
guidelines is to incentivize managers to promote the long-term value of the 
company.195 
According to a 2018 report by Meridian Compensation Partners analyzing 
the executive compensation policies of the “Meridian 200,” “200 large publicly 
traded companies across a variety of industries . . . with median revenues and 
market capitalization of $15.5B and $30.5B, respectively,” 99% of firms 
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impose stock ownership guidelines on their top executives.196 On average, these 
firms require that their CEO obtain and maintain company shares with a value 
of at least 6.3 times their annual salary.197 Most companies (67%) specify that 
the ownership amount requirement must be achieved within five years.198 Fifty-
five percent of companies further require executives to hold a specified 
percentage of shares and options received as compensation until the ownership 
amount requirement has been achieved: 47% of these firms say 100% of shares 
received must be held, and 41% say 50% must be held.199 According to Equilar, 
stock-ownership guidelines have rapidly increased in popularity and 
restrictiveness in recent years.200 
In addition to ownership guidelines, 68% of firms include restricted stock 
units as part of their executive compensation packages (on average, 20% of an 
executive’s long-term incentive plan is made up of restricted stock units).201 
Restricted stock units generally vest over a period of several years and thus are 
further subject to time-based sale limitations.202 
The federal securities laws regulating insider trading impose additional 
limitations on the sale of company shares by executives and directors. In 
general, executives and directors must always be concerned about potential 
insider trading liability when selling and buying company shares, because these 
individuals are, by the nature of their work, often in possession of material non-
public information. One way of avoiding insider trading liability is to only sell 
shares pursuant to a 10b5-1 plan, which provides a safe harbor if the executive 
sells shares under a plan adopted and filed with the SEC before obtaining 
material non-public information that specifies the amounts, prices, and dates of 
the to-be-conducted sales.203 
The numerous restrictions imposed on executive share sales, while not 
adding up to a blanket five-year sale limitation, create a system whereby 
executives are unable to sell significant portions of their shares for at least 
several years and must also hold a substantial amount of equity throughout their 
entire period of service. It thus seems unlikely that the Accountable Capitalism 
Act provision would promote a significant change in executive compensation 
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policies or managerial behavior. If executives are already required to hold a 
significant amount of their company’s stock throughout their tenure, retain 
most of their equity compensation for up to several years, and pre-file their 
share sale plans with the SEC, it is doubtful that executives would view Senator 
Warren’s proposed five-year and three-year sale limitations as attaching 
significant additional burdens to equity compensation. Additionally, while 
restricting corporate share buybacks is a laudable goal, as discussed earlier in 
Subsection IV.B.1, it is unlikely that restricting stock buybacks alone would 
result in lower levels of executive compensation. 
2. Worker Representation on Boards 
Worker representation on boards is another promising, stakeholder-
empowering policy proposal. Worker representatives would add economic 
diversity to corporate boards and could advocate for the interests of the 
company’s workers and other stakeholders. One might also expect worker 
representatives to advocate for limits on executive compensation payouts 
because this would free up corporate funds to increase wages or benefits. 
However, based on evidence from Germany, where worker supervisory board 
representation has been mandatory since 1976,204 there is reason to predict that 
worker board representation alone would be insufficient to effectively constrain 
executive pay growth. Worker board representation in Germany did not 
promote sufficient constraints on executive compensation and may have made 
it more difficult for corporate boards to control executives. 
According to some German corporate-governance scholars, worker 
representation on supervisory boards significantly altered board dynamics in 
ways that made it more difficult to control management.205 A number of factors 
have likely contributed to this effect, including fractionalization of the 
supervisory board into adverse factions, dilution of the supervisory board’s 
powers as some authority shifted to shareholders or management, and collusion 
by one of the two “benches” (either the shareholder or worker representatives) 
and management.206 Further, the history of Germany’s say-on-pay law indicates 
that worker board representation did not sufficiently resolve executive 
compensation excess.  Concern over rising executive pay was widespread into 
the late 2000s, prompting the German legislature to adopt Germany’s own say-
on-pay law in 2009.207 This history shows that while mandatory worker board 
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representation in the United States may serve other progressive goals, it will 
probably not lead to direct limits on executive pay. 
3. An Affirmative Duty to Stakeholders 
The Accountable Capitalism Act would impose a duty on corporate 
officers and directors to balance the “pecuniary interests of shareholders” with 
those of other stakeholders.208 A full discussion of this potentially promising 
proposal is beyond the scope of this Note. Without more information about 
how this obligation would work in practice, though, it is unclear that it would 
directly and effectively limit executive compensation growth. 
___________________ 
The recent wave of progressive, stakeholder-oriented legislative proposals 
is evidence of an emerging consensus on the proper role of corporate law in 
addressing economic inequality. The new progressive stakeholder-primacy 
theory of corporate law holds that shareholder interests are currently 
overvalued at the expense of the rest of society. The proper cure is to require 
and enable corporate boards to serve the interests of stakeholders in addition to 
those of shareholders, reallocating corporate profits away from shareholders 
and toward workers, communities, and consumers. In order to fully effect this 
reallocation, boards must be directly incentivized and empowered to place 
limits on executive compensation in all forms. Further, as the extensive 
findings of economists such as Piketty, Saez, and Stiglitz have established, 
direct limits on executive compensation are critical to sufficiently addressing 
economic inequality in the United States.209 Progressive politicians have yet to 
rally behind a strong vision for executive-compensation regulation. If they are 
going to sufficiently address economic inequality, though, they must do so. 
This finding naturally raises the question of why progressive politicians 
have failed to propose policies that would impose effective, direct constraints 
on corporate boards’ discretion in setting executive pay. Though a full 
discussion of the political dynamics at play here is beyond the purview of this 
Note, some exploration of the most salient potential factors is warranted. For 
one, electoral concerns are undoubtedly influential.210  Three of the senators 
discussed in this Note have announced their intention to run in the 2020 
Democratic presidential primary: Elizabeth Warren, Cory Booker, and Bernie 
Sanders.211 These politicians may have shied away from proposing policies that 
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would impose direct, hard limitations on executive compensation levels for fear 
of losing potential wealthy donors, many of whom could be corporate political 
action committees (PACs) or corporate executives themselves.212 Secondly, 
such a policy would be unprecedented. As discussed in Part II, none of the 
United States’ current executive compensation laws impose direct, meaningful 
limitations on corporate boards in setting executive compensation policies.213 A 
truly effective stakeholder-primacy approach to executive compensation would 
need to break free of the current policy framework. The next Part outlines how 
this might be achieved while avoiding potential political pitfalls. 
V. Toward Stakeholder-Focused, Board-Empowering Executive Compensation 
Laws 
In this Part, I present a three-pronged executive-compensation policy 
proposal for the new progressive stakeholder primacy movement. My proposed 
policy aims to place much-needed, meaningful restrictions on executive 
compensation levels and fit within the corporate-governance framework of 
stakeholder primacy. This policy would avoid the failings of our nation’s 
current executive-compensation laws and those recently proposed by 
progressive politicians by 1) targeting and empowering the board of directors 
directly, rather than relying on shareholder participation, 2) applying equally to 
all forms of compensation, and 3) giving a voice to stakeholders in the pay-
setting process. As discussed throughout this Part, timing and messaging would 
be critical to the political viability of this proposal. 
The proposed policy would 1) require boards to balance the interests of all 
stakeholders by placing a cap on the permissible executive-median employee 
pay ratios of U.S. companies (Section V.A), 2) give workers a voice in 
approving executive-compensation policies (Section V.B), and 3) push back on 
shareholders’ ability to steer corporations toward short-termism, excessive risk-
taking, and shareholder value maximization by repealing say on pay (Section 
V.C). I discuss each of these policy proposals in turn. 
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A. Industry-Based Caps on Corporations’ Top Executive-Median Employee 
Pay Ratios 
This Section argues for a mandatory cap on the ratios of U.S. companies’ 
top executive-compensation payouts and median-worker wages. The past 
several decades of failed executive-compensation laws in the United States 
have underscored an enduring reality: policies that seek to rein in executive pay 
levels solely through indirect, incentive-based means do not work. The 
lackluster legacies of the executive compensation deductibility cap, executive 
compensation disclosure requirements, and shareholder say on pay are all 
evidence of this actuality.214 Direct limitations on executive pay levels are the 
only certain way to constrain America’s runaway executive compensation 
growth. This is why I propose federally mandated, industry-based caps on 
corporations’ highest-paid executive-median employee pay ratios.215 
Though Americans generally detest hard caps regulating companies’ 
policy decisions,216 there is growing precedent for this proposal in the United 
States and abroad. Most notably, Senator Sanders’s proposed Stop WALMART 
Act would impose a CEO-median worker pay ratio cap of 150 on companies 
with over 500 employees as a prerequisite to engaging in stock buybacks.217 
Several state governments, including California, Illinois, Massachusetts, and 
Portland, Oregon, and local governments, have considered imposing business 
tax surcharges of between ten and twenty-five percent on businesses with pay 
ratios above a specified cap.218 Looking farther afield, policymakers in 
Germany and the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund have both proposed setting 
hard caps on allowable executive-compensation payouts.219 
This proposal would undoubtedly carry political risks. As noted in Part 
IV, some progressive politicians may have declined to propose policies that 
would directly and effectively limit executive compensation levels in order to 
avoid upsetting potential donors. Strategic messaging would be key to avoiding 
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such a risk. In announcing this proposed provision, progressive politicians 
could focus on the provision’s use of the pay ratio as its relevant benchmark, 
emphasizing that the legislation’s goal is to strike a reasonable balance between 
worker and executive pay and ensure that American workers earn a decent 
wage. 
This provision could be added to the Accountable Capitalism Act model, 
requiring that companies keep their pay ratios below the industry caps in order 
to obtain and maintain a federal corporate charter through the Office of United 
States Corporations. Consistent with other provisions of the Act,220 the pay-
ratio cap could be implemented jointly by the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) and the SEC. This policy could also be implemented outside of the 
Accountable Capitalism Act model. The pay-ratio cap could be added to the 
federal securities laws as a requirement for all companies that are registered 
issuers of securities under the Securities Act of 1933 or reporting issuers under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. To prevent large private companies from 
skirting the pay-ratio cap, the proposed law could amend the Securities 
Exchange Act to provide a separate, lower cap which companies must remain 
below to avoid triggering public company status. In order to create a regime 
responsive to changing market dynamics and industry-specific considerations, 
the pay-ratio schedule would be industry-specific and updated every several 
years. The legislation’s definition of “worker” would need to be carefully 
drafted to include independent contractors, overseas employees, and part-time 
employees.221 
B. Worker Say on Pay 
An important policy goal of the progressive stakeholder-primacy 
movement is involving stakeholders in corporate-governance processes. One 
way to achieve this goal while placing further constraints on executive 
compensation levels would be to create a mandatory, nonbinding worker “say-
on-pay” vote for all U.S. companies with annual revenues above $1 billion or 
with more than a specified number of employees. This policy would be 
administered jointly by the SEC and the NLRB. 
Requirements in the United Kingdom’s Takeover Code provide a rough 
analogue for this proposed policy. A provision of the U.K. Takeover Code 
gives target company employee representatives the opportunity to publicly 
opine on a takeover bid’s potential impact on employees.222 Another provision, 
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adopted in May 2013, provides trustees of target-company employee pension 
plans the opportunity to publicly share their opinion on the likely effects of the 
acquirer’s bid on the target’s pension plans.223 
There is also precedent for similar policy proposals in the emerging 
stakeholder primacy movement. In October 2018, Senator Tammy Baldwin and 
twelve other Senate Democrats wrote a letter to the SEC encouraging it to 
expand its concept of “corporate ownership” and consider policies “to give 
workers a greater voice at public companies,” particularly through worker 
board representation.224 Worker say on pay would not be vulnerable to the 
pitfalls of shareholder say on pay because workers would be much more 
incentivized to discipline growth in income inequality and promote long-term 
investment through non-deferential voting. Further, worker say on pay would 
avoid the managerial-control problems potentially introduced by worker board 
representation, because this policy would not affect the composition of boards 
of directors. 
C. Repealing Shareholder Say on Pay 
The discussion in Section IV.D established that in addition to being 
ineffective at controlling general executive compensation levels, shareholder 
say on pay likely exacerbates economic inequality by “ratifying” massive pay 
packages and encouraging short-termism and excessive risk-taking by 
managers.225 The obvious fix is to repeal the Dodd-Frank Act’s say-on-pay 
provision. Consistent with stakeholder primacy’s governance ethos, the repeal 
of shareholder say on pay would make corporate boards less beholden to 
shareholder-value maximization and would empower directors to consider a 
balanced set of stakeholder interests in setting executive compensation policies. 
The political viability of this proposal would be highly dependent on careful 
messaging. Policy-makers proposing this legislation would need to emphasize 
shareholder say on pay’s record of inefficacy, the economic inequality harms 
created by shareholder say on pay, and statistics showing that, contrary to 
popular perception, shareholders represent the wealthy few rather than the 
average working American. 
Conclusion 
It has been decades since Americans began complaining about sky-high 
executive pay packages, and nearly as long since the nation became concerned 
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with its swiftly widening income and wealth gaps. Emboldened by a rising 
populist sentiment in U.S. politics, the emerging progressive stakeholder-
primacy movement seems poised to finally address this inequality through 
bold, targeted policies. Extensive economic research has established that 
policies aimed at lessening American economic inequality will not succeed 
unless they address income and wealth at the very top—a large portion of 
which is due to meteoric executive compensation growth. Progressive 
politicians are in the process of developing promising, stakeholder-oriented 
policy proposals, some of which will likely be included in the Democratic 
Party’s 2020 policy platform. The eighty-seven percent of Americans who have 
been negatively affected by economic inequality growth should hope that a 
robust policy proposal to constrain executive compensation is among them. 
